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CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON: CHILD VICTIMS OF SEX
CRIMES IN COLORADO AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT'S REVISED APPROACH TO THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that on several occasions an adult male molests a three-
year-old child named Jimmy who lives in a Colorado neighborhood.1
The man threatens Jimmy with a knife, promising to slit Jimmy's throat
and kill Jimmy's parents if Jimmy ever reveals their secret. The man
may do it right away or he may do it twenty years from now, but he as-
sures Jimmy he will someday fulfill his promise. Jimmy is terrified.
Local law enforcement eventually becomes aware of the situation after
Jimmy musters the courage to confide in his parents. A physician exam-
ines Jimmy. During their investigations, police officers and social work-
ers interview Jimmy, gaining sufficient details about the molestations to
obtain an arrest warrant. An expert in child molestation cases interviews
Jimmy, his friends, and his family, determining that changes in Jimmy's
behavior since the alleged molestations began are typical of a sexually
abused child. The police arrest the man, charging him with several
counts of sexual assault. The case proceeds to trial.
Because of Jimmy's youth and the defendant's threats against
Jimmy and his parents, Jimmy cannot speak when called to the witness
stand. The court rules Jimmy incompetent, and, thus, Jimmy is unavail-
able to testify at trial. 2  The prosecution then moves to admit hearsay
statements by Jimmy via testimony from police officers, the physician,
social workers, and Jimmy's parents. The prosecution notes that in cases
of unlawful sexual offenses against children, the court may accept these
hearsay statements into evidence under Colorado's child hearsay excep-
tion provided the presence of "sufficient safeguards of reliability" and
1. The criminal acts against "Jimmy" are hypothetical and presented here for illustrative
purposes. Although this Comment focuses on the effects of Crawford v. Washington on a trial of the
defendant for alleged sexual abuse of Jimmy, the effects are the same if the alleged acts solely con-
sisted of physical abuse.
2. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-106 (2004) ("The following persons shall not be wit-
nesses: Children under ten years of age who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the
facts respecting which they are examined or of relating them truly."). The hypothetical scenario
assumes that Jimmy was not "able to describe or relate in language appropriate for a child of that age
the events or facts respecting which the child is examined." Id. Alternatively, a court could find
Jimmy unavailable ahead of trial if it determines that testifying might harm him emotionally or
physically. See People v. Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d 741, 750 (Colo. 1989) (holding that "unavailability
... can be met when the court makes a particularized finding that the child's emotional or psycho-
logical health would be substantially impaired if she were forced to testify and that such impairment
will be long standing rather than transitory in nature.").
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"corroborative evidence."3 The prosecution argues that the independent
findings of the child molestation expert support these two criteria.
Objecting, the defense claims that admission of the statements un-
der Colorado's child hearsay exception would violate the defendant's
right of confrontation as outlined in Crawford v. Washington.4 Specifi-
cally, the Confrontation Clause requires that "[iln all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him.",5 Crawford declares, "Where testimonial statements
are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitu-
tional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confronta-
,6tion." According to Crawford, "[the Confrontation Clause] commands
. . . that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by . . . cross-
examination."7 Because the defense considers all the statements at issue
"testimonial," they claim that the trial court cannot admit Jimmy's hear-
say statements, regardless of any "safeguards of reliability" and "cor-
roborative evidence," because they could not cross-examine him.
This Comment analyzes Crawford v. Washington8 with particular
emphasis on determining what constitutes a testimonial statement and
whether Colorado courts must now refuse to admit hearsay statements by
child molestation victims if they cannot testify in open court before their
alleged abusers. Part I describes key precedent cases. Part II recites
Crawford's facts and procedural history. Part III summarizes the major-
ity and concurring opinions. Part IV analyzes critical parts of Crawford,
attempting to predict whether a Colorado trial court will consider
Jimmy's various hearsay statements testimonial and, thus, refuse to ad-
mit them into evidence. Included in the discussion is a summary of post-
Crawford Colorado state court decisions. In conclusion, Part V predicts
that for testimonial statements the Colorado child hearsay exception,
enacted to protect alleged victims of sexual offenses against children,
may not withstand constitutional scrutiny under the Crawford approach
to the Confrontation Clause.
I. KEY PRECEDENT CASES
For more than one hundred years, the United States Supreme Court
has attempted to define the precise rules for the admissibility of hearsay
statements made by witnesses rendered unavailable to testify against a
3. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (2004).
4. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
7. Id. at 61. See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (stating that confronta-
tion "forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the greatest legal engine ever invented for
the discovery of truth.").
8. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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criminal defendant at trial.9 Because a literal reading of the Confronta-
tion Clause bars the admission of any hearsay statements, these rules
represent exceptions to a defendant's confrontation right.1° The follow-
ing summarizes key Supreme Court Confrontation Clause decisions lead-
ing up to Crawford v. Washington.
11
The first significant Supreme Court case dealing with exceptions to
a literal reading of the Confrontation Clause is Mattox v. United States.
12
In Mattox, an 1895 decision, the Court approved the admission at trial of
the official transcripts of testimony from two deceased witnesses based
on the defendant's prior opportunity to cross-examine them fully.1 3 Prior
to their deaths, the two witnesses testified in the defendant's initial fed-
eral first-degree murder trial. 14 The defendant, however, successfully
appealed his conviction, and the two witnesses died before his new
trial.' 5 The Court ruled that admission of the transcripts at the new trial
did not violate the defendant's Confrontation Clause right because "[t]he
substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in
the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and of
subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination."' 6 The Court noted
further, "general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their
operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case."' 17 Over
the next one hundred and nine years leading up to and including Craw-
ford, much of the Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence sought to
articulate the appropriate circumstances under which the Confrontation
right "gave way" to these considerations.
The Court widened the right of Confrontation through two opinions
issued in 1965. In Pointer v. Texas,18 the Court invoked the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause to expand the Confrontation Clause to
include state court criminal proceedings. 19 In Douglas v. Alabama,2° the
Court stated "that a primary interest secured by [the Confrontation
Clause] is the right to cross-examination; an adequate opportunity for
cross-examination may satisfy the clause even in the absence of physical
9. See Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. REV. 537, 556-91
(2003) (discussing the history of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence from 1895 to 2003).
10. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
11. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
12. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
13. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 238-40, 250.
14. Id. at 240, 251.
15. Id. at 238, 240.
16. Id. at 244.
17. Id. at 243.
18. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
19. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403.
20. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
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confrontation. ' 2' These decisions, however, did not address exceptions
to the Confrontation Clause for unavailable witnesses.
In two subsequent opinions, the Court focused on the circumstances
under which a court may appropriately consider a witness "unavailable"
and, thus, invoke exceptions to the Confrontation Clause. In a 1968 de-
cision, Barber v. Page,22 the Court stated, "a witness is not 'unavailable'
for purposes of the ... exception to the confrontation requirement unless
the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his
presence at trial.",23 The Court provided further guidance as to the mean-
ing of "unavailable" in a 1970 case, California v. Green.24 In Green,
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion deemed unavailability "a question of
reasonableness. 25 In addition to providing guidelines for unavailability,
the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence leading up to
Crawford dealt almost entirely with determining the appropriate degree
of reliability required for the admission into evidence of a statement
given by an unavailable witness.
In its most significant Confrontation Clause decision preceding
Crawford, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of reliability in a 1980
case, Ohio v. Roberts.2 6 In Roberts, the Court summarized its Confronta-
tion Clause philosophy by stating:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at
trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without
more in a case where the evidence falls within afirmly rooted hear-
say exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
27
The phrases, "firmly rooted hearsay exception" and "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness," essentially comprise a two-part test for
admissibility of statements by unavailable declarants.28 At issue in Rob-
erts was the admissibility at trial of testimony given by an unavailable
witness against the defendant at a preliminary hearing.29 "The Court
found guarantees of trustworthiness in the accouterments of the prelimi-
nary hearing itself' because the defendant was represented by counsel
and had already had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
21. Douglas, 380 U.S. at 418.
22. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
23. Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25.
24. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
25. Green, 399 U.S. at 189 n.22 (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
27. Roberis, 448 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 58-62.
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ness.30  Given a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness," the Court allowed for the admissibility of
statements by unavailable declarants without cross-examination.3' Both
of these phrases, in addition to "unavailability," acquired further clarifi-
cation in the Court's subsequent decisions.
Six years later in United States v. Inadi,32 the Court rejected a literal
reading of its Roberts holding, stating, "Roberts cannot fairly be read to
stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be
introduced by the government without a showing that the declarant is
unavailable." 33  In Inadi, the court affirmed admission of a co-
conspirator's out-of-court statement despite an inadequate showing of the
witness's unavailability under the hearsay exemption for statements by a
co-conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy.34 Because statements in
furtherance of a conspiracy are "usually irreplaceable as substantive evi-
dence [because their admission] . .. furthers the Confrontation Clause's
very mission which is to advance the accuracy of the truth-determining
process in criminal trials," 35 the Court declined to apply an unavailability
rule to them.36 Furthermore, the rule for co-conspirator statements would
"place[] a significant practical burden on the prosecution" because of the
practical difficulties in identifying and locating such declarants.37 Since
trial courts do not admit many co-conspirator statements to prove the
truth of the matter asserted,38 the Court reiterated a position it took one
year previous in Tennessee v. Stree?9 that "admission of nonhearsay
raises no Confrontation Clause concems." 4  Given a valid hearsay
statement, the question remained as to whether a particular hearsay ex-
ception qualifies as "firmly rooted" under Roberts.
In Idaho v. Wright,41 a 1990 decision, the Court further clarified
"firmly rooted hearsay exception" by saying such an exception "[is] so
trustworthy that adversarial testing [can be expected to] add little to [its]
30. Id. at 73.
31. ld. at 66.
32. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
33. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394.
34. Id. See also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) ("A statement is not hearsay if ... the statement
is offered against a party and is... a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.").
35. lnadi, 475 U.S. at 396.
36. Id. at 394-95.
37. Id. at 399.
38. Id. at 398 n.11.
39. 471 U.S. 409 (1985).
40. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 398 n.l 1 (quoting Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)).
Valid non-hearsay purposes include: questions, verbal acts, clarifications of conduct, state of mind
(including knowledge of the declarant, notice of the recipient, intent, motive, beliefs, thoughts, or
other states of mind), acquaintance, or connection. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 801.11 (2d ed. 2004). Crawford maintained Street's approach.
124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9. See also infra note 170 and accompanying text.
41. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
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reliability. ' '42 In Wright, a pediatrician asked a two and one-half year old
girl a series of questions about alleged acts of molestation against her.
43
After determining that the girl could not communicate with the jury and,
therefore, was unavailable, the trial court allowed the pediatrician to tes-
tify as to the girl's statements via Idaho's residual hearsay exception.
44
Pointing to the "ad hoc" nature of the residual hearsay exception, the
Court did not consider it "firmly rooted. '4 5 Thus, under the Roberts doc-
trine, the statement was admissible only if it bore "particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness." 46  The Court said that these guarantees are
"shown from the totality of the circumstances, but ... the relevant cir-
cumstances include only those that surround the making of the statement
and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief."47 The Court
carefully noted, however, that in order to avoid "bootstrapping" on other
evidence at trial, corroborating evidence plays no role in determining
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. '48 After Wright, the Court
returned to the "unavailability rule" and the hearsay exceptions for which
to apply it.
The Court applied the Inadi rationale in White v. Illinois,49 a 1992
decision, by refusing to apply an "unavailability rule" to the hearsay ex-
ceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements made in the course
of receiving medical care.50 The Court noted that "such out-of-court
declarations are made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of
their trustworthiness [and that] . . . the statements' reliability cannot be
recaptured even by later in-court testimony.",51 The Court also provided
some guidance as to whether the two hearsay exceptions in question
were "firmly rooted," referring to their respective age, enumeration in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and acceptance among the states. 52 Justices
Thomas and Scalia, however, strongly disagreed with this philosophy.
Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in White, joined by Justice
Scalia,53 foreshadows Crawford by hinting at the key Crawford term,
42. Wright, 497 U.S. at 821.
43. Id. at 808-11.
44. Id. at 805.
45. Id. at 817.
46. Id. at 818. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; see also supra text accompanying note 27.
47. Wright, 497 U.S. at 818.
48. Id. at 823.
49. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
50. White, 502 U.S. at 348-49. Rule 803(2) excludes from the hearsay rule "[a] statement
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition" even though the declarant is available as a witness. FED. R. EvID.
803(2); Rule 803(4) excludes from the hearsay rule "[s]tatements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensa-
tions, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasona-
bly pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" even though the declarant is available as a witness. FED. R.
EviD. 803(4).
51. White, 502 U.S. at 355-56.
52. Id. at 356 n.8.
53. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Crawford.
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"testimonial. 54 Justice Thomas stated that he believed the "federal con-
stitutional right of confrontation extends to any witness who actually
testifies at trial.",55 As for the admissibility of statements made by those
who do not testify, Justice Thomas opined, "the Confrontation Clause is
implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained
in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions." 56 Justice Thomas suggested that this narrow-
ing of the Confrontation Clause "would greatly simplify the inquiry in
the hearsay context. ''57 Justice Thomas offered his point of view because
he reasoned "the Confrontation Clause was [not] intended to constitu-
,,58
tionalize the hearsay rule and its exceptions. Nevertheless, through
White, the Court continued to hold to the Roberts "firmly rooted hearsay
exception" and "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" two-part
test.
In Lilly v. Virginia,59 a 1999 opinion representing the Court's final
pre-Crawford Confrontation Clause decision, the Court exhibited the
uncertainties inherent in the two-part Roberts test, as well as philosophi-
cal differences amongst the nine Justices.60 In Lilly, a witness invoked
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the separate
criminal trial of one of his accomplices. 6' Given his unavailability, the
trial court admitted the witness's tape-recorded confession to the police
pursuant to Virginia's hearsay exception for statements against penal
interest.62 On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, finding this
hearsay exception "firmly rooted" and reliable.63 All nine Justices of the
United States Supreme Court agreed that "[t]he admission of the untested
confession.. . violated petitioner's Confrontation Clause rights."
64
Despite their agreement that a Confrontation Clause violation oc-
curred, the Court nevertheless issued a plurality opinion plus four differ-
ent concurring opinions to describe its reasoning. In the plurality opin-
ion, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer did not consider the
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest "firmly rooted"
because of the tendency for such statements to shift blame to a criminal
54. White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring).
56. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
57. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 366 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also Richard P. Friedman, Confrontation: The
Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1020 (1998) (stating that "[a] near synonym for
'firmly rooted,' it seems, is in the Federal Rules of Evidence."). Although Crawford ultimately
adopted Justice Thomas's position, it did so as part of a much broader philosophy of what constitutes
"testimonial." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52. See also infra text accompanying notes 157-159.
59. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
60. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 116.
61. Id. at 120-21.
62. Id. at 121.
63. Id. at 122. See also Lilly v. Virginia, 499 S.E.2d 522, 534 (Va. 1998).
64. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 119, 139.
20041
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defendant.65 The Justices termed the exception "presumptively unreli-
able. 66 They also stated that the witness's "statements were [not] so
inherently reliable that cross-examination would have been superflu-
ous." 6 7 Justice Breyer indicated in his concurring opinion a willingness
to "reexamine the current connection between the Confrontation Clause
and the hearsay rule" but declined to do so because "the statements at
issue violate the Clause regardless. 68 Justice Scalia, writing separately,
considered use of the tape-recorded confession without cross-
examination "a paradigmatic Confrontation Clause violation. 69 Justice
Thomas, also writing alone, reiterated his belief first presented in White
that the Confrontation Clause applies to witnesses testifying at trial and
to four specific types of extra-judicial statements, one of which is confes-
sions.70 Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist along with Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy agreed that the hearsay exception was not firmly rooted,
but they feared that the approach of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer would place a "blanket ban on the government's use of ac-
complice statements that incriminate a defendant."'- Rather than consid-
ering the exception "presumptively unreliable," Chief Justice Rehnquist
preferred to "limit our holding to the case at hand., 72 Based on the plu-
rality opinion and four concurring opinions, Lilly illustrates the problems
with Roberts due to the difficulty in grasping the meaning behind "firmly
rooted hearsay exception" and "particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness."
The Colorado Supreme Court, as well as courts in other states,
adopted specific guidelines for determining the "particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness" of a given statement.7 3 In People v. Farrell,74
the Colorado Supreme Court, after noting "a statement against interest
made by a co-defendant during custodial interrogation does not fall
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, ' 75 applied an eight-factor test
to find the statement bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthi-ness."76 The Colorado Supreme Court justified these factors based on
65. Id. at 131 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J., joining).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 139 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J., joining).
68. Id. at 142 (Breyer, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 143 (Thomas, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., Kennedy, J., concurring).
72. Id.
73. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60.
74. 34 P.3d 401 (Colo. 2001), overruled in part by People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004).
75. Farrell, 34 P.3d at 406 (quoting Stevens v. People, 29 P.3d 304, 313 (Colo. 2001)).
76. The eight factors were:
(1) whether the statement was truly self-inculpatory; (2) whether the statement was de-
tailed; (3) whether police officers threatened or coerced the defendant to make the state-
ment; (4) whether the confession was offered in exchange for leniency; (5) whether the
declarant was likely to have personal knowledge of the events in the statement; (6)
whether the declarant made the statement shortly after the described events; (7) whether
[Vol. 82:2
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the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Wright, giving "a court...
considerable discretion in determining what factors may enhance or de-
tract from the statement's reliability.
77
Thus, Lilly and Farrell illustrate the status of the Confrontation
Clause just prior to Crawford as it pertains to the admissibility of state-
ments made by unavailable declarants: apply the Roberts two-part test
according to the Court's guidance in its post-Roberts opinions. The next
two parts of this Comment contain a detailed discussion of Crawford.
II. FACTS AND PRIOR HISTORY: CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON78
On August 5, 1999, police arrested petitioner Michael Crawford for
allegedly stabbing Kenneth Lee.79 Mr. Crawford believed Mr. Lee had
previously tried to rape his wife, Sylvia Crawford.8° Mrs. Crawford led
Mr. Crawford to Mr. Lee's apartment, where she witnessed the stab-
bing. 81 Following the altercation, Mr. Crawford claimed self-defense.82
Accounts given by Mr. and Mrs. Crawford of the fight between Mr. Lee
and Mr. Crawford differed "with respect to whether Lee had drawn a
weapon before [Mr. Crawford] assaulted him."83  Mrs. Crawford's ac-
count suggested the stabbing was not an act of self-defense.
84
At trial, the State sought testimony from Mrs. Crawford against Mr.
Crawford, but the state of Washington's marital privilege barred her tes-
timony.8S The statutory privilege, however, "[did] not extend to spouse's
out-of-court statements admissible under a hearsay exception., 86 Alter-
natively, the State sought to admit into evidence previously recorded
statements from Sylvia Crawford to the police. 87 Because Mrs. Crawford
led Mr. Crawford to Mr. Lee's apartment, the court admitted these state-
ments under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest.
88
the declarant had a reason to retaliate against the defendant; and (8) whether the declarant
was mentally or physically unstable at the time of the confession.
Id. at 406-07 (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 406. See also Wright, 497 U.S. at 822. The United States Supreme Court even
hinted at a four-factor test in Wright for determining "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
Wright, 497 U.S. at 821-22 (stating that "spontaneity and consistent repetition.., mental state of the
declarant ... use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age [and] lack of motive to fabri-
cate [are] factors relatting] to whether the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the
truth when the statement was made."(citations omitted)).
78. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
79. 541 U.S. at 38.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 40.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 39.
84. Id. at 40.
85. Id. at 39.
86. Id. at 40.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see WASH. ER 804(b)(3) ("A statement which was at the time of its making ... so far
tended to subject the declarant to ... criminal liability ... that a reasonable person in his position
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true."). See also FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(3).
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Mr. Crawford objected, claiming admission of the evidence violated his
rights under the Confrontation Clause. 89  The trial court nevertheless
admitted Mrs. Crawford's statements based on a reliability analysis un-
der Ohio v. Roberts.90 The court determined that her statements bore
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."9' The jury convicted Mr.
Crawford, and he appealed.92
Mr. Crawford's appeal hinged on the determination of "trustworthi-
ness." 93 In reversing, the Washington Court of Appeals applied a nine-
factor test to determine the trustworthiness of Mrs. Crawford's recorded
statements. 94 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals ruled that her statements
failed the test.95 The Washington Supreme Court, however, restored Mr.
Crawford's conviction, finding that Mrs. Crawford's statements were
indeed trustworthy.
96
In petitioning for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, Mr.
Crawford asked the Court to reconsider its holding in Roberts regarding
the admissibility of statements by unavailable hearsay declarants.97  The
Court "granted certiorari to determine whether the State's use of [Mrs.
Crawford's] statement violated the Confrontation Clause." 98
III. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINION: CRAWFORD V.
WASHINGTON 99
While refashioning its Confrontation Clause doctrine, effectively
overturning Roberts, the Court reversed the Washington Supreme
Court's decision to uphold Mr. Crawford's conviction and remanded the
case for further proceedings.1° While all nine Justices supported revers-
ing the conviction in its March 8, 2004 opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist
89. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
90. Id.; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); See also supra text accompanying note 27.
91. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
92. Id. at41.
93. Id. at 41-42.
94. Id. at 41. The nine factors were:
[1] whether the declarant had an apparent motive to lie [2] whether the declarant's
general character suggests trustworthiness . . . [3] whether more than one person heard
the statement . . . [4] whether the declarant made the statement spontaneously . . . [5]
whether the timing of the statements and the relationship between the declarant and the
witness suggests trustworthiness ... [6] whether the statement contained express asser-
tions of past fact ... [7] whether cross-examination could help to show the declarant's
lack of knowledge .. .[8] whether the declarant's recollection was faulty because the
event was remote . . . [9] whether the circumstances surrounding the statement suggest
that the declarant misrepresented the defendant's involvement.
Washington v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-11, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 1723, at *13-16 (Wash.
Ct. App. July 30, 2001).
95. Id. at *16; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41.
96. Washington v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663 (Wash. 2002); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41-42.
97. Crawford, 541 U.S. at41.
98. Id. at 42.
99. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
100. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69.
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and Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Court's new Confrontation
Clause doctrine. l t
A. Justice Scalia 's Majority Opinion: The Reliability of Testimonial
Statements Will Be Evaluated Solely by Cross-Examination
Claiming "[t]he Constitution's text does not alone resolve this
case," ' 0 2 Justice Scalia's majority opinion began with an extensive his-
tory-spanning from Roman times to the mid-nineteenth century-of a
defendant's right to confront his or her accuser.10 3 Particularly notewor-
thy are discussions of the 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason,'04
English cases following the Raleigh decision supporting the right of
cross-examination, 0 5 adoption of a confrontation right in the declarations
of rights of eight colonies during the initial phase of the American Revo-
lution, 10 6 and early state court decisions in the new United States.
0 7
From this historical perspective, the Court derived two inferences about
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.
10 8
The first inference was that "the principal evil at which the Con-
frontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal proce-
dure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence
against the accused."' 1 9 After the Court carefully pointed out that the
Confrontation Clause applies to both in-court and out-of-court witness
statements, it noted that not all hearsay statements bear "resemblance to
the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted."" 0  To distin-
guish out-of-court statements that fall under the scrutiny of hearsay rules
from those that fall under the scrutiny of the Confrontation Clause, the
Court fashioned a term, "testimonial statement.""' Testimonial state-
101. Id. at 70.
102. Id. at 42.
103. Id. at 43-44.
104. Id. In many of the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause decisions, the trial of Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh for treason receives mention because it dramatically illustrates the importance of con-
frontation. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 141 (1999); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
157 (1970); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361 (1992) (Thomas, J. concurring). At Raleigh's 1603
trial, an English court sentenced him to death based on a letter from Lord Cobham, Raleigh's alleged
accomplice. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. During the trial, Raleigh, convinced Cobham fabricated the
story to save himself, repeatedly protested the court's refusal to bring Cobham before the jury. Id.
The judges refused and Raleigh was sentenced to death. Id. In California v. Green, Justice Harlan
stated that the right of confrontation "was a common law right which had gained recognition as a
result of the abuses in the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh." Green, 399 U.S. at 178 (Harlan, J. concur-
ring).
105. ld. at 44-45.
106. Id. at 48-49.
107. Id. at 49.
108. id. at 49-57.
109. Id. at 50.
110. Id. at 51.
111. Id.
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ments fall under scrutiny of the Confrontation Clause, while non-
testimonial statements do not."
l2
The second inference from the Court's historical analysis was "that
the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements
of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to tes-
tify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination."' 3 Furthermore, "the common law in 1791 conditioned
admissibility of an absent witness's examination on unavailability and a
prior opportunity to cross-examine."' 14 Alluding to and refuting the reli-
ability analysis in Roberts, the Court noted that cross-examination was "a
necessary [] condition for admissibility of testimonial statements" with
the only exception being dying declarations." 
5
In summarizing its precedent case law, the Court stated it had re-
mained faithful to two key principles derived from the historical perspec-
tive: 1) thwarting the evil of admitting ex parte examinations into evi-
dence against the accused and 2) barring out-of-court testimonial state-
ments made without the opportunity for cross-examination. 116 With re-
spect to Roberts, the Court stated that while "the results of our decisions
have been faithful to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause,
the same cannot be said of our rationales."' '17 Specifically, the Court
chose to reconsider its Roberts two-part test in order "to reflect more
accurately the original understanding of the [Confrontation] Clause."
118
In changing its approach to the Confrontation Clause, the Court in-
dicated a preference that jurors rather than judges determine the reliabil-
ity of testimonial statements." 9 Specifically, the Court stated that the
Confrontation Clause is a "procedural rather than a substantive guaran-
tee," requiring that "reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by
cross examination.,, 120 Under Roberts, because a judge rather than a jury
determined the reliability of statements, Roberts "replace[d] the constitu-
tionally prescribed method of assessing reliability with a wholly foreign
one."
12 1
The Court also described the poor framework that resulted in the
lower courts due to the reliability analysis dictated by Roberts.'12  Be-
cause various courts developed different tests for determining reliability,
112. Id. at 51-52.
113. Id. at 53-54.
114. Id. at 54.
115. Id. at 55-56.
116. Id. at 58-60.
117. Id. at 60.
118. Id.
119. Id. at62.
120. Id. at 61.
121. Id. at 62.
122. Id. at 63-(4.
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predictability suffered. 123 Beyond unpredictability, tests for reliability
under Roberts developed an ability to "admit core testimonial statements
that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude."'124 As an exam-
ple, the Court stated that the Washington trial court found Mrs. Craw-
ford's recorded statement reliable because, among other reasons, law
enforcement was "neutral to her" during questioning. 125 The Court noted
that "[t]he framers would be astounded to learn that ex parte testimony
could be admitted against a criminal defendant because it was elicited by
'neutral' government officers."' 26 Because judges can "not always be
trusted," the Court stated that Roberts may not provide meaningful pro-
tection to defendants during politically charged public trials like that of
Sir Walter Raleigh. 1
27
The majority summarized its position with the following:
Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with
the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their develop-
ment of hearsay law-as does Roberts, and as would an approach
that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny
altogether. Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the
Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavail-
ability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 
128
The court "leaves for another day" the task of determining the defi-
nition of "testimonial.' 29 The Court said, however, that "it applies at a
minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand
jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations" because they are
"modem practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Con-
frontation Clause was directed."' 130 In closing, the Court explicitly quali-
fied its Roberts holding by stating that "[w]here testimonial statements
are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitu-
tional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confronta-
tion."'' Hence, the majority appears to have overruled Roberts only
with respect to testimonial statements.
B. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Concurring Opinion: The Court Should
Not Overturn Ohio v. Roberts
Joined by Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in
the Court's decision to reverse and remand the decision of the Washing-
123. Id. at 62.
124. Id. at 63.
125. Id. at 66.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 67.
128. Id. at 68.
129. Id.
130. Id. See infra Section IV.A. for an extensive analysis of what constitutes "testimonial."
131. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
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ton Supreme Court. 13 2  However, both Justices dissented "from the
Court's decision to overrule [Roberts].' 33  Preferring to rely on the
Court's "long-established precedent," the Chief Justice stated that the
majority opinion "casts a mantle of uncertainty over future criminal trials
in both federal and state courts, and is by no means necessary to decide
the present case."
134
The Chief Justice disagreed with the two-thousand-year historical
summary the majority invoked to help justify its holding. 35 He pre-
sented his own historical summary and said, "[tihe Court's distinction
between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, contrary to its claim,
is no better rooted in history than our current doctrine."'136  Because
"unswom hearsay was simply held to be of much lesser value than were
sworn affidavits of depositions," the Chief Justice believed there was
historical preference for statements taken under oath. 137  He reasoned
that, "[w]ithout an oath, one usually did not get to the second step of
whether confrontation was required.' 38 The Chief Justice referred to the
majority's distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial state-
ments-outside of affidavits and depositions-as arbitrary because he
was unable to find a distinction in common law between unsworn testi-
monial statements and nontestimonial statements. 39 Pointing out that the
Court had never made such a distinction, the Chief Justice saw little
value in changing precedent.140
The Chief Justice also suggested, "to find exceptions under the
Clause is not to denigrate it as the Court suggests.,"14' He noted, "some
out of court statements are just as reliable as cross-examined in-court
testimony due to the circumstances in which they were made."' 142 On this
basis, the Chief Justice argued for retention of several hearsay excep-
tions: co-conspirator statements, spontaneous declarations, statements
made in course of procuring medical services, and "countless others.' 4 3
Thus, the Chief Justice stated that because "a statement might be testi-
monial does nothing to undermine the wisdom of one of these [hearsay]
exceptions.'" 144
132. Id. at 68 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
133. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
134. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
135. Id. at 69-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
136. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
137. Id. at 71 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
138. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
139. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
140. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
141. Id. at 73 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
142. Id. at 74 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
143. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
144. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
[Vol. 82:2
CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
Aside from his preference for precedent and hearsay exceptions, the
Chief Justice criticized the majority for the uncertainty the decision
would create in state and federal criminal trials. 145  Specifically, he
warned that the majority's failure to define "testimonial" left "thousands
of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors...
in the dark."' 46 Nevertheless, the Court left an analysis of "testimonial"
to others.
IV. ANALYSIS
Although the Confrontation Clause contains only eighteen words,
United States Supreme Court cases spanning more than a century from
Mattox through Crawford indicate an inherent complexity in articulating
its proper usage. From a historical perspective, the Supreme Court obvi-
ously intended Crawford to restore the Confrontation Clause to a posi-
tion as close to its roots as possible. Yet, from the more practical per-
spective of prosecution and defense attorneys, the Court replaced one
generally worded doctrine, Roberts, with another, Crawford. Roberts
challenged practitioners to determine the meaning of "firmly rooted" and
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Crawford challenges
practitioners to answer a question that will undoubtedly receive consid-
erable attention for many years to come: was that statement a testimonial
statement?
Recall that the hypothetical case against the man who allegedly mo-
lested Jimmy hinges on the admissibility of statements Jimmy made to:
1) the police; 2) a physician; 3) social workers; and 4) his parents. Since
Jimmy is unavailable for cross-examination, this analysis explores
whether each of these types of statements are testimonial and reviews
post-Crawford opinions from various jurisdictions. Section A dissects
Crawford v. Washington 47 further, summarizing the key phrases useful
to both prosecutors and defense attorneys when arguing the testimonial
or nontestimonial nature of such statements. Using some of these clues
and catchphrases, along with various post-Crawford decisions, Section B
analyzes whether the four types of statements in the case against
Jimmy's alleged perpetrator are testimonial. Section C predicts that
Colorado's child hearsay exception, which would probably permit the
admission of all four statements pre-Crawford, will face a difficult con-
stitutional scrutiny post-Crawford. Finally, Section D describes signifi-
cant post-Crawford decisions issued to date by Colorado state courts.
145. Id. at 75-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
146. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
147. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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A. The Meaning of "Testimonial:" Key Phrases
This Section summarizes key phrases within Crawford that will aid
prosecutors and defense attorneys in arguing the testimonial or nontesti-
monial nature of Jimmy's statements. As mentioned, Jimmy will not be
testifying due to his unavailability, and the defense has not had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine him. Numbers (1) through (18) below list
the key phrases in the order in which they appear in Crawford:
(1) Testimonial "applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a pre-
liminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to po-
lice interrogations."' 148 Courts should interpret the term, "interroga-
tion," in a colloquial rather than a legal sense.149
(2) "[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was di-
rected was the civil-law.., use of ex parte examinations as evidence
against the accused."
150
(3) The Confrontation Clause applies to both out-of-court and in-
court statements.
151
(4) Witnesses under the Confrontation Clause are "those who bear
testimony."'
' 52
(5) Testimony under the Confrontation Clause is "a solemn declara-
tion or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving
some fact."'
153
(6) "An accuser who makes a formal statement to government offi-
cers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual re-
mark to an acquaintance does not."'
54
(7) Testimonial statements include "ex parte in-court testimony or
its functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custo-
dial examinations, prior testimony that defendant was unable to
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially."'' 55 This is the first of
three "core class" formulations of "testimonial."'
' 56
148. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
149. Id. at 53 n.4. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2463 (2004) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (stating, "police questioning during a Terry stop qualifies as an interrogation,
and it follows that responses to such questions are testimonial in nature.").
150. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
151. Id. at 50-51.
152. Id. at 51.
153. Id.
154. Id.




(8) Incorporating Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in White v.
Illinois,157 testimonial statements include "extrajudicial statements
. . . such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confes-
sions."' 58 This is the second of three "core class" formulations of
"testimonial."1
59
(9) Testimonial statements include those "statements that were
made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at
a later trial." 16 0 This is the third of three "core class" formulations of
"testimonial." 1
6 1
(10) Whether statements are sworn or unswom makes no difference
in determining whether they are "testimonial." 
162
(11) Business records are nontestimonial.
163
(12) Statements in furtherance of a conspiracy are nontestimonial.164
(13) Dying declarations may or may not be testimonial. 16 5 When
they are, they represent an exception to the bar against admission of
testimonial statements into evidence without a prior opportunity for
cross-examination. 166
(14) When a defendant wrongfully renders a witness unavailable, a
court may still admit a testimonial statement via "the rule of forfei-
ture by wrongdoing [which] extinguishes confrontation claims on es-
sentially equitable grounds." 1
67
(15) "Involvement of government officers in the production of testi-
mony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecu-
torial abuse .... This consideration does not evaporate when testi-
mony happens to fall within some broad, modem hearsay exception,
even if that exception might be justifiable in other circumstances."
168
157. 502 U.S. 346, 358-66 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
158. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (Thomas, J. con-
curring)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 52 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers, et al. at 3).
161. Id. at51.
162. See id. at 52.
163. See id. at 56.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 56 n.6.
166. Id. The Court indicated, however, that it might address the issue in a future case. "We
need not decide in this case whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial
dying declarations." Id.
167. Id. at 62.
168. Id. at 56 n.7.
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(16) "[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his
prior testimonial statements."
1 69
(17) "The [Confrontation] Clause also does not bar the use of testi-
monial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the
matter asserted."'70
(18) "Plainly testimonial statements" also include: plea allocutions,
grand jury testimony, and prior trial testimony.
171
For some types of statements, phrases (1) through (18) will clearly
indicate whether they are testimonial. For those in the gray area, these
eighteen phrases provide only possibilities or indications. For these
types of statements, the final determination of "testimonial" will likely
depend in the short term on the facts of a particular case plus the argu-
mentative skills of prosecutors and defense attorneys, and in the long
term, on the development of case law.
For gray area statements, Crawford appears to rely on the intent of
both the declarant and the listener/receiver in distinguishing testimonial
statements from nontestimonial ones. From the declarant's perspective,
a nontestimonial statement would be a casual remark (Phrase 6), or more
broadly, a statement made without both a reasonable belief that it would
be used prosecutorially (Phrase 7) and an objective reasonable belief that
it would be used at a trial (Phrase 9). The likelihood of a statement being
nontestimonial will increase if the declarant made it to an acquaintance
rather than a government official (Phrase 6). From the listener/receiver's
perspective, simply being a government official significantly decreases
the likelihood of a nontestimonial designation (Phrases 1 & 6). A gov-
ernment official, however, can receive a nontestimonial statement so
long as it was not received with "an eye towards trial." (Phrase 15).172
Given the Court's concern with ex parte examinations against the ac-
cused (Phrase 2), attempts by prosecutors to argue that a government
official received a statement without an eye towards trial will probably
receive scrutiny. Thus, for gray area statements, the eighteen key
phrases contained within Crawford indicate that 1) a declarant can give a
testimonial statement to a nongovernmental listener; and 2) a govern-
169. Id. at 59 n.9.
170. fd. See People v. Reynoso, 814 N.E.2d 456, 465 (N.Y. 2004) (holding that admission of
statement "not to establish the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to show the detective's state of
mind" did not constitute a Confrontation Clause violation under Crawford). See also supra note 40
and accompanying text.
171. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 65.
172. Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Restores Confrontation Clause
Protection, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2004, at 4, 9 (stating "I do not believe that participation by gov-
ernment officials-either receipt of the statement as the initial audience of the statement or active




mental official can receive a nontestimonial statement. In the case
against the defendant accused of molesting three-year-old Jimmy, several
of Jimmy's statements fall into this gray area.
B. Are the Statements in the Case Against Jimmy's Perpetrator "Testi-
monial"?
This Section discusses whether the following statements are testi-
monial: Jimmy's statements to: 1) the police; 2) a physician; 3) social
workers; and 4) his parents. As illustrated below, whether a court will
consider each of these statements testimonial will depend on the specific
circumstances surrounding the statement itself.
1. Are Jimmy's Statements to the Police "Testimonial"?
In all likelihood, Crawford will not allow admission of Jimmy's
statements against the defendant as attested to by the police. Crawford
explicitly referred to statements given during police interrogations as
"testimonial."'' 73 The Court mandated the "colloquial meaning" of inter-
rogation, 174 which could simply mean to "question formally and system-
atically.' 75 Thus, the trial courts might determine that statements given
by Jimmy to the police are "testimonial." Because the defendant lacked
the ability to cross-examine Jimmy when Jimmy made his statements to
the police, the Crawford interpretation of the Confrontation Clause ex-
plicitly bars their admission. 76 Nevertheless, a chance to admit the
statements may exist if the prosecutor draws a distinction between state-
ments made to the police by children and statements made to the police
by adults.
In interpreting the Confrontation Clause, Crawford defines wit-
nesses against the accused as "those who bear testimony."'' 77 Testimony
is defined as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose
of establishing or proving some fact."' 7 8 When adult witnesses speak to
the police, particularly in the wake of a crime, they usually understand
the importance of their statements. They are likely to realize that their
spoken words may someday become part of a judicial proceeding. One
might reasonably impugn to them the knowledge that, when speaking to
the police, they bear testimony. Conversely, a three-year-old child like
Jimmy may not understand he is bearing testimony when speaking to
anyone, much less the police. Perhaps this distinction can overcome a
testimonial designation, allowing admission of his statements under the
173. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. See also supra text accompanying notes 130 and 148.
174. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 n.5.
175. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, at http://www.m-w.com/home.htm (last
visited Apr, 11, 2005).
176. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69; see also supra text accompanying note 128.
177. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
178. Id. (quoting 1. N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)).
2004]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
hearsay exception for excited utterances. 179  Crawford may support this
position, given that testimonial statements are "made under circum-
stances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that
the statement would be available for use at a later trial.' 180 So far, courts
have largely rejected this line of argument.' 81
In response to Crawford, one victim's rights advocate adjusted her
police officer training program. 182 The new training suggests that offi-
cers "take notes of a victim's demeanor at the scene-such as, 'she was
screaming, she was crying'-to prove that the statement was an excited
utterance and not the product of interrogation."'183 Presumably, this tech-
nique will decrease the likelihood that a court will consider the victim's
statement testimonial. Unfortunately, taking such notes may not produce
the advocate's desired results. Under Crawford, if the police officer's
interrogation fits within the colloquial meaning of an interrogation, the
statement is testimonial regardless of the manner in which the declarant
made it.' 84 Furthermore, although a declarant may be screaming or cry-
ing, she may still "reasonably . . . believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial."'8 Although the fact that the declarant is
screaming or crying increases the chance that a court will deem her
statement an excited utterance, Crawford does not guarantee that it is
nontestimonial, particularly when a police officer records the statement
on a notepad with an eye towards trial. 186 Crawford addresses the issue
by stating, "[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interro-
gations are . . . testimonial under even a narrow standard."' 87  As re-
179. See COLO. R. EViD. 803(2) ("A statement relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition."). See also
FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
180. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
181. See People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 758 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (stating "[i]t is
more likely that the Supreme Court meant simply that if the statement was given under circum-
stances in which its use in a prosecution is reasonably foreseeable by an objective observer, then the
statement is testimonial"), petition for review denied, No. S125799, 2004 LEXIS 8716 (Cal. Sept.
14, 2004); People v. Rolandis, 817 N.E. 2d 183, 189 (Ell. App. Ct. 2004).
Given that the declarant must be unavailable for the confrontation clause issue to come
into play, how would the speaker's subjective understanding be determined? The State
merely speculates about the thought process of young children generally. The objective
circumstances surrounding V.J.'s statements to Cure and Weber show that they were tes-
timonial.
Id. But see People v. Vigil, No. 02CA0833, 2004 LEXIS 1024, at *7-9 (Colo. Ct. App. June 17,
2004) (applying test from "objective person in the child's position," but nevertheless labeling a
seven-year-old child's statements testimonial due to the presence of a police officer who made
statements to child indicating accused could go to jail), cert. granted, No. 04SC532, 2004 LEXIS
1030 (Colo. Dec. 20, 2004).
182. Wendy N. Davis, Hearsay, Gone Tomorrow?: Domestic Violence Cases at Issue as
Judges Consider Which Evidence to Allow, 90 A.B.A. J. 22, 24 (2004).
183. Id. at 24.
184. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53.
185. Id. at 51-52.
186. Id. at62.
187. Id. at 52.
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flected by a series of decisions in New York, emergency 911 calls touch
on the precise limits of this "narrow standard."
In People v. Cortes,188 a New York trial judge considered a 911 call
testimonial because it "was [made] for the purpose of invoking police
action and the prosecutorial process."'189  In response to a 911 dis-
patcher's questions, an unidentified eyewitness provided information on
the "location, description, and direction of movement" of a shooter.' 9
Because "callers to 911 reporting crimes are likely to know the use to
which the information will be put," Cortes considered the circumstances
of this particular 911 call an interrogation. To support its position,
Cortes noted that police department internet web pages in New York
City and other jurisdictions often contain a very specific list of questions
for 911 callers to answer if they have observed a crime.' 92 A check of
similar web sites in Colorado shows that the Boulder Police Depart-
ment's site contains a similar set of questions. 193 Referring to 911 calls
reporting a crime as the "modem equivalent, made possible by technol-
ogy" of the ex parte examinations frowned upon in Crawford, Cortes
considered the 911 call testimonial and, thus, inadmissible.194
In contrast, two other New York trial judges did not consider 911
calls testimonial given the facts of their cases. In People v. Moscat,195
both the prosecution and defense believed a domestic assault victim
would refuse to testify and, thus, debated the admissibility of a recording
of the victim's 911 call. 19 6 Terming a 911 call "the electronically aug-
mented equivalent of a loud cry for help," usually made while a crime is
in progress or in its immediate aftermath, Moscat did not consider the
call testimonial. 97 Based on Crawford, Moscat stated, "[a] testimonial
statement is produced when the government summons a citizen to be a
witness; in a 911 call, it is the citizen who summons the government to
188. 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
189. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
190. Id. at 404.
191. Id. at 407.
192. Id. at 405-06. Cortes noted that the New York City Police Department's website stated:
What should you do if you see a crime occurring?; Call 911 immediately; Are there any
weapons involved?; What is the address?; Any physical characteristics such as height,
weight, race, beard, or scars?; Any clothing description?; How many people involved?;
Are the persons involved on foot or in a vehicle?"
Id. (citation omitted).
193. The Boulder Police website advises callers to:
Be prepared to answer the following questions: What is happening?; When did it hap-
pen?; Where is the incident taking place?; Are there weapons involved?; What does the
vehicle look like?; What is the license plate number?; What do the suspects look like?;
What is the direction of travel of the suspects, either on foot or in a vehicle?
City of Boulder Police Department, The 9-1-1 Emergency Dispatch System, at
http://www3.ci.boulder.co.us/police/reference/911 .htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
194. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
195. 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004).
196. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
197. Id. at 880.
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her aid." 198 In People v. Conyers,199 a mother made two 911 calls within
minutes of each other regarding a street fight involving her son, the de-
fendant.2°  In the first call, the mother screamed for police assistance.2
In the second, she screamed for an ambulance.20 2 The mother never testi-
fied at trial.20 3  Conyers did not consider the calls testimonial because,
given her "panicked and terrified screams. . . her intention in placing the
911 calls was to stop the assault in progress and not to consider the legal
ramifications of herself as a witness in a future proceeding."
2 4
Considered together, the three New York cases exhibit the tension
created by Crawford between whether the question of labeling a state-
ment testimonial properly hinges on the declarant's intent in giving it, the
government's intent in receiving it, or both. From one perspective, the
declarant's intent is irrelevant because Crawford considers statements
testimonial when made with the "[i]nvolvement of government officers
in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial .... Cer-
tainly, this is one reason jurisdictions choose to record 911 calls. They
know such recordings provide valuable information for criminal proceed-
ings. From the opposite perspective, Crawford also defines testimonial
statements as "statements that were made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial.''206 Some objective 911 callers
may only reasonably believe that their call will be used to acquire assis-
tance. Hence, different circumstances and different ways of looking at
the 911 call affect whether it is testimonial. Under Crawford, therefore,
situations involving 911 calls will require a "case-by-case assessment
,,207.... , Hence, although Jimmy's statements to police will probably be
testimonial under Crawford, the 911 cases indicate that, depending on
198. Id. at 879. But see supra Section V.A. (clearly Crawford does not limit testimonial
statements to situations where the government summons a citizen to be a witness).
199. 777 N.Y.S.2d 274 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
200. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75.
201. Id. at 275.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 277.
205. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7. See also supra text accompanying note 168.
206. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. See also supra text accompanying note 160.
207. Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Confronta-
tion Clause Protection, CRIM. JUST., Summer, 2004, at 4, 10; see also Minnesota v. Wright, 686
N.W.2d 295, 302-03 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), rev granted in part, No. A03-1197, 2004 Minn. LEXIS
750 (Minn. Nov. 23, 2004).
A 911 call is usually made because the caller wants protection from an immediate danger,
not because the 911 caller expects the report to be used later at trial with the caller bear-
ing witness-rather, there is a cloak of anonymity surrounding 911 calls that encourages
citizens to make emergency calls and not fear repercussion, [and] no evidence suggests
... that... [the] 911 call was handled under a formalized protocol.
Id. People v. Caudillo, 122 Cal. App. 4th 1417, 1430-40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling that
"details provided by [anonymous 911] caller were elicited in order to facilitate appropriate
police response, not to provide evidence to be used at a later trial."), rev grantedbriefing
deferred, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294 (Cal. 2005).
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the facts of a given situation, statements to police or government officials
are not automatically per se testimonial.
2. Are Jimmy's Statements to a Physician "Testimonial"?
As part of the sexual assault investigation, a physician examines
Jimmy. During the examination, the physician discovers injuries indica-
tive of molestation. When the doctor asks Jimmy who hurt him, Jimmy
identifies the defendant. As indicated by three recent state court deci-
sions, whether Jimmy's statements to the physician are testimonial will
depend heavily on the specific circumstances under which they were
given.
In Nebraska v. Vaught,208 the Nebraska Supreme Court considered a
four year-old girl's identification of the defendant as a sexual assault
209perpetrator to an emergency room physician. Vaught held that the
child's identification was nontestimonial because "[t]here was no indica-
tion of a purpose to develop testimony for trial, nor was there an indica-
tion of government involvement in the initiation or course of the exami-
nation., 210 The physician testified at trial that "it is important for [the
physician] ... to know who the perpetrator was, both so that he does not
release a patient into the care of a perpetrator and for purposes of treating
the patient's mental well-being., 211 Although Vaught considered identi-
fication statements to physicians nontestimonial, other courts have not
taken the same approach.
People v. T. T.212 differentiated statements given by a seven-year-old
girl to a physician for purposes of symptoms and pain from those given
to the same physician for purposes of identifying the perpetrator. 2 " The
girl made her statements six months after the alleged assault.214 T. T.
considered the portion of the girl's statements "regarding the nature of
the alleged attack, the physical exam, and complaints of pain or injury"
nontestimonial . 5 T. T., however, considered the portion of her state-
216ments that "concerned fault or identity" testimonial. The doctor to
whom the girl made her statements "was a member of a child abuse pro-
tection unit at the hospital and had previously testified as an expert wit-
ness in child abuse cases." 217 Although social services referred the girl to
the doctor, the court in .T. did not find that fact controlling.218 Nor was
208. 682 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 2004).
209. Vaught, 682 N.W. 2d at 285-87.
210. Id. at 291.
211. Id. at 287.
212. 815 N.E.2d 789 (111. App. Ct. 2004).
213. T.T., at 804.
214. Id. at 803.
215. Id. at 804.
216. Id.
217. Id at 803.
218. ld.
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it persuaded by the relationship between the doctor and social services
under the umbrella of the hospital's child abuse protection unit.
219
Rather, TT. simply considered the girl's identification statement testi-
monial because it was accusatory.22°
In People v. Cage,2 ' the California Court of Appeals determined
that a fifteen-year-old boy's statement to an emergency room doctor that
"he had been held down by his grandmother and cut by his mother"
222
22was nontestimonial. z23 Cage determined that the boy's statement was
nontestimonial because "[the doctor] was not a police officer or even an
agent of the police [and that to use the statement against the defendant]
bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause
targeted. 224 Furthermore, Cage rejected the defendant's attempt to ar-
gue that the boy, as a reasonable person, made the statement with a belief
that it would later be used at trial.225 Cage rejected this argument even if
the boy "had thought the doctor might relay his statements to the police
[because] anyone who obtains information relevant to a criminal investi-
,226gation might.., pass it along to the police." Cage did not consider
this possibility enough to justify a testimonial designation for the boy's
statement.2 7
Thus, because Jimmy's statements to his physician fall into a gray
area rather than one of Crawford's explicit definitions of "testimonial,"
admissibility will hinge on the specific facts of his case. As indicated by
Vaught and Cage, his statements may be nontestimonial if a court does
not find a reasonable expectation that his statements would be used at a
trial. T.T., however, seems to indicate that the mere accusatory nature of
identifying one's perpetrator may be testimonial by default. Hence, the
persuasive abilities of prosecutors and defense attorneys, the specific
facts of Jimmy's case, and the developing case law will all determine
whether his statements to his physician are "testimonial."
3. Are Jimmy's Statements to Social Workers "Testimonial"?
Admissibility of Jimmy's statements to social workers presents a
similar challenge because Crawford did not explicitly list out-of-court
statements to social workers as "testimonial." In Crawford, the Court
219. Id.
220. Id. at 804.
221. 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), petition for rev granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).
222. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), petition for rev granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal.
2004).
223. Id. at 854-55.
224. Id. at 854.
225. Id. at 855. Interestingly, Cage opined the rather radical proposition that the three "core
classes" of testimonial statements identified in Crawford were not adopted by the United States
Supreme Court, but rather, the Court "merely noted that they exist." Id. at 855. See supra notes





indicated, "an accuser who makes a formal statement to government of-
,228ficers bears testimony .... .. While some social workers may not be
per se government officials, they all have duties imposed upon them by
the government. For instance, Colorado requires social workers to report
child abuse or neglect if they have "reasonable cause to know or suspect
that a child has been subjected to abuse or neglect., 229 If a trial court
considers the social workers to be government officials, then the process
for determining admissibility follows that of Jimmy's statements to the
police. If the trial court does not equate the social workers with govern-
ment officials, then Crawford seems to indicate that the next step for the
trial court is to determine whether admitting the statement is a "modern
practice with close[] kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed.,
230
As stated in Crawford's lengthy historical analysis, the founders di-
rected the Confrontation Clause at the evil of using ex parte examina-
tions against the accused.23' Suppose a social worker interviews Jimmy
in a non-leading fashion. Eventually Jimmy tells her about the molesta-
tion committed by the defendant. A determinative factor is whether the
interview resembles an ex parte examination against the accused.232 If a
court determines that the social worker's purpose in working with Jimmy
is to ascertain for law enforcement whether the defendant committed acts
233of sexual molestation, the statement will be testimonial. Several recent
decisions in state courts reflect the difficulties in admitting testimony
from social workers post-Crawford.
In Maryland v. Snowden,234 the Maryland Court of Appeals af-
firmed the reversal of a defendant's child molestation conviction ob-
tained in part on hearsay statements made by two child abuse victims to a
social worker.235 Pursuant to Maryland's "tender years statute," the so-
cial worker testified in lieu of the children. The Maryland Court of
Appeals based its decision on the fact that the defense did not have an
opportunity to cross-examine the children and that "an ordinary person in
the position of any of the declarants would have anticipated the sense
that her statements to the sexual abuse investigator potentially would
have been used to prosecute Snowden. ' 37 Snowden rejected arguments
228. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
229. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304(1) (2004).
230. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
231. Id. at 49-50. See also supra text accompanying note 109.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 61-62. One possible way for the social worker to testify is to confine her analysis
solely to an observation of Jimmy's behavior, and later testify as an expert witness as to the likeli-
hood that someone molested him. This possibility seems rather useless, for it requires the social
worker to refrain from eliciting statements from Jimmy.
234. No. 42, Sept. Term, 2004, 2005 Md. LEXIS 35 (Md. Feb. 7, 2005).
235. Id. at *3.
236. Id. at *8-9.
237. /d. at *29.
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made by Maryland's Solicitor General, who claimed the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals decisions affirmed by Snowden "misconstrued Craw-
ford, and that "statements of young children to a social worker are not
testimonial. 238 Snowden indicates that unless child molestation victims
testify at trial with the opportunity for cross-examination by the defense,
courts may bar hearsay statements attested to by social workers.239 In
other jurisdictions, various opinions indicate a strong tendency towards
considering statements to social workers testimonial.240  Thus, because
Jimmy's statements to social workers may be testimonial, and therefore
inadmissible, Crawford could significantly change the methodologies by
which social workers discuss instances of alleged sexual abuse with
young children.
4. Are Jimmy's Statements to his Parents "Testimonial"?
Jimmy's parents are not government officials. In confiding to his
parents, Jimmy probably did not make his statements with the intent of
bearing testimony. He simply spoke to his parents. Nevertheless, admis-
sibility of Jimmy's statements to his parents depends on whether they are
"testimonial." In Crawford, the Court states, "[a]n accuser who makes a
formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a
person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.,
24 1
Jimmy's statements to his parents do not conform to either extreme. He
did not make them to a government official, and, given the subject mat-
ter, they certainly were not casual. His statements fall in the gray area
between the two endpoints. Admissibility may, therefore, depend on the
nature of Jimmy's statement. To illustrate, consider two extremes. First,
238. David L. Hudson Jr., New Clout for Confrontation Clause: Citing U.S. Supreme Court,
Maryland Overturns Sex-Abuse Conviction, 3 No. 17 ABAJEREP 1, at http://www.westlaw.com
(last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
239. Snowden, 2005 Md. LEXIS at *3.
240. See In re T.T., 815 N.E. 2d 789, 803 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004) (stating "[w]e do not hold that all
statements made to a social worker are per se testimonial under Crawford. We think it possible that
a scenario could arise in which a report to the [social worker agency] hotline or statements of sexual
abuse overheard by a social worker would be admissible as nontestimonial hearsay"); Minnesota v.
Courtney, 682 N.W.2d 185, 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling that statements elicited from a child
during an interview by a child-protection worker monitored by the police chief via closed-circuit
television were testimonial), rev. granted in part and denied in part, No. A03-790 and A03-791,
2004 Minn. LEXIS 575 (Sept. 29, 2004); People v. Warner, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 429 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that since a detective observed multi-disciplinary center specialist's interview with a
minor child "it was reasonably expected the interview would be used prosecutorially and at trial");
People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a child's statements
to social workers was testimonial because the "interview took place after a prosecution was initiated,
was attended by the prosecutor and the prosecutor's investigator, and was conducted by a person
trained in forensic interviewing." The Court declined to hold that statements to all trained inter-
viewers are testimonial), petition for rev. denied, No. S125799, 2004 LEXIS 8716 (Cal. Sept. 14,
2004); But see People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling that "the child's
statement was made to the executive director of the Children's Assessment Center, not to a govern-
ment employee, and the child's answer to the question of whether she had an 'owie' was not a
statement in the nature of 'ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent."'), appeal denied,
688 N.W.2d 829 (Mich. 2004).
241. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 5 .
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Jimmy complains to his parents of pain and soreness in his private areas.
Since it is unlikely Jimmy expressed his pain with any inclination to-
wards a trial, the statements are not testimonial. Under the hearsay ex-
ception for then existing mental, emotional, or physical conditions and/or
the hearsay exception for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment,
Jimmy's parents may recount their son's complaints in court.242 Second,
at another extreme, suppose Jimmy says to his parents, "that man down
the street has been touching my private areas." Since this is no longer a
casual remark, but rather, an accusatory statement, courts may consider it
testimonial and allow the parents to describe it only if Jimmy later testi-
fies in court with an opportunity for cross-examination by the defense.
Accordingly, "whether a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial is
going to depend on the circumstances of the particular out-of-court
statement."
24
Jimmy's statements to the police, to an emergency room physician,
to social workers, and to his parents do not appear to conform to any
explicit definition of "testimonial" found within Crawford. Prosecutors
and defense attorneys must therefore draw from the various phrases from
Crawford, case law, the facts of their cases, and their persuasive abilities
244to argue for or against the admissibility of each statement.
C. The Uncertain Fate of Colorado's Child Hearsay Exception
Colorado's child hearsay exception, based on Roberts, provides for
admission of Jimmy's out-of-court statements.245 Similar laws protecting
child victims of sex crimes, commonly referred to as "tender age laws,"
exist in many other states.246 In People v. Diefenderfer,247 the Colorado
242. See COLO. R. EvtD. 803(3) ("A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind,
emotion, sensation, or physical condition."); See COLO. R. EviD. 803(4) ("Statements made for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symp-
toms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."); See also FED. R. EvID. 803(3); FED. R.
EviD. 803(4). Even if Jimmy identifies the alleged perpetrator when talking to his doctor, his state-
ment may still be nontestimonial. State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 291 (Neb. 2004) (ruling that a
child's identification of the alleged molester during examination by an emergency room physician
was nontestimonial because there was no "indication of a purpose to develop testimony for trial, nor
was there an indication of government involvement in the initiation or course of the examination."
The physician testified at trial, "it is important for [the physician] ... to know who the perpetrator
was, both so that he does not release a patient into the care of a perpetrator and for purposes of
treating the patient's mental well-being.").
243. David L. Hudson Jr., New Clout for Confrontation Clause: Citing U.S. Supreme Court,
Maryland Overturns Sex-Abuse Conviction, 3 No. 17 ABAJEREP 1, at http://www.westlaw.com
(last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
244. Justice Thomas's complaint in White still seems to apply post-Crawford: "[i]t is ... not
clear. . . whether the declarant or the listener (or both) must be contemplating legal proceedings."
White v. Illinois 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment).
245. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (2004).
246. See Snowden v. Maryland, 846 A.2d 36, 39 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), affd by, No. 42,
Sept. Term, 2004, 2005 Md. LEXIS 35 (Md. Feb. 7, 2005); Carol A. Chase, The Five Faces of the
Confrontation Clause, 40 Hous. L. REV. 1003, 1059-60 (2003).
247. 784 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1989).
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Supreme Court upheld Colorado's child hearsay exception under Rob-
erts.248 Specifically, the exception states that a court may admit Jimmy's
out-of-court statements if:
(a) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the
jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement pro-
vide sufficient safeguards of reliability; and
(b) The child either:
(I) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(l1) Is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of
the act which is the subject of the statement 2 49 (emphasis added).
Many approaches to determining "sufficient safeguards of reliabil-
ity" exist.250 Corroborative evidence is "evidence, direct or circumstan-
tial, that is independent of and supplementary to the child's hearsay
statement and that tends to confirm that the act described in the child's
statement actually occurred., 251  In Jimmy's case, behavioral observa-
tions made by the child molestation expert may have qualified as cor-
roborative evidence independent of and supplementary to Jimmy's hear-
say statements.
Post-Crawford, admissibility of Jimmy's statements under the child
hearsay exception will depend on whether they are testimonial. Craw-
ford will not affect the admissibility of nontestimonial statements, be-
cause for those statements Crawford "afford[ed] the States flexibility in
their development of hearsay law-as does Roberts ..... 252 if Jimmy's
statements are testimonial and, thus, require cross-examination for ad-
missibility under Crawford, then Colorado's hearsay exception, given its
Roberts-based reliance on "sufficient safeguards of reliability," cannot
survive constitutional scrutiny. Post-Crawford, Colorado's child hearsay
exception should apply only to nontestimonial statements and testimonial
statements coupled with an opportunity to cross-examine the child.253
248. Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d at 746-53.
249. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (2004).
250. See People v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1083, 1089-90 (Colo. 1989) (establishing an eight-
factor test for reliability in cases concerning children); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821-22 (1990)
(establishing a four-factor test for reliability concerning a child's hearsay statement). See generally
People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 406-07 (Colo. 2001) (establishing a general eight-factor test for
reliability), overruled in part by People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004).
251. People v. Bowers, 801 P.2d 511, 525 (Colo. 1990).
252. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
253. Due to a lack of standing, the Colorado Supreme Court refused to consider the constitu-
tionality of COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129(b)(Il), the portion of Colorado's child hearsay exception
modeled after Roberts. People v. Argonamiz-Ramirez, 102 P.3d 1015, 1018-19 (Colo. 2004). In an
order reversing a trial court's decision to exclude videotaped interviews of two children by the
police, the Court noted that the children would be testifying at trial. Id. Because defense counsel
could cross-examine the children, the Court declined the defendant's request to "pass . . .judgment
on the constitutionality of that portion of the child hearsay statute ...." Id.
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For cases like the hypothetical one involving Jimmy, Crawford cre-
ates a difficult situation: sometimes it may force prosecutors to put a
very young and vulnerable child like Jimmy on the witness stand. In
Diefenderfer, the decision that upheld the constitutionality of Colorado's
child hearsay exception under Roberts, the court stated that the Colorado
child hearsay exception "effects the substantive policy of protecting cer-
tain witnesses-in this case child witnesses-from the sometimes trau-
matizing effect of facing their abusers openly in court., 254 At least for
testimonial statements, Crawford trumps this policy.
The potential demise of Colorado's child hearsay exception for tes-
timonial statements carries with it a potentially increased frequency for
defense attorneys to use cross-examination to manipulate very young
children like Jimmy into contradicting their previous statements.25 5 Of
course, such tactics may backfire on the defense by creating sympathy
for the child in the jury's eyes. 6 Nevertheless, Colorado does provide
for in-court techniques designed to mitigate the negative impact on
young children while simultaneously maintaining the defendant's con-
frontation rights.
Colorado law already allows for two techniques to help protect
young children: videotaped depositions and closed circuit testimony.
Colorado permits videotaped depositions prior to trial if a child is less
than fifteen years of age and is "medically unavailable or otherwise un-
available., 257 If the child is still unavailable once trial begins, the court
may admit the videotape into evidence.258 Second, Colorado law allows
testimony via closed circuit television in cases concerning alleged sexual
offenses against children less than twelve years of age if the child's tes-
timony "would result in the child suffering serious emotional distress or
trauma such that the child would not be able to reasonably communi-
cate. ' ,259 For such testimony, only the prosecuting attorney, defense at-
torney, guardian ad litem, operators of the closed-circuit television
equipment, a person who "contributes to the welfare and well-being of
the child victim", and the jury may be in the room with the child.26 The
judge and defendant remain in the courtroom. 61 So long as trial judges
allow their use, both videotaped depositions and closed circuit television
254. Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d at 753.
255. See Richard P. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J.
1011, 1037-38 (2003).
256. See id.
257. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3413 (2004). See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-401.3
(2004) (providing videotape depositions for non-sexual child abuse).
258. Id. at § 18-3-413(4). Since this statute mandates that the court carry out the child's depo-
sition according to COLO. R. GRIM. P. 15(d), prosecution and defense attorneys for both sides are
present before the judge, and, thus, the deposition affords the defense an opportunity to cross-
examine the child. COLO. R. GRIM. P. 15(d).
259. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413.5(l)(a)(fl) (2004).
260. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413.5(2)(a) (2004).
261. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413.5(2)(b) (2004).
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will continue to provide protection to alleged victims of child molesta-
tion even after Crawford.
D. Post-Crawford: An Indication of Colorado's Approach
This section summarizes Colorado court cases issued since Craw-
ford. Because a few cases represent only a marginal relationship to the
hypothetical case against Jimmy's alleged perpetrator, they do not appear
in detail below.263 Instead, the following contains descriptions of the
more significant cases.26"
In People v. Fry,265 the Colorado Supreme Court determined that
"preliminary hearings in Colorado do not present an adequate opportu-
nity for cross-examination. ' '266  In reaching this conclusion, the Court
262. See e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990) (holding that "the state interest in
protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently impor-
tant to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child witness .. . to testify . . . in the
absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant."); Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confron-
tation Clause, 54 S.C. L. REv. 537, 588 (2003) (discussing the Supreme Court's acceptance of
allowing a child to testify outside the court room in the presence of prosecution and defense counsel
with the defendant, able to communicate with his attorney, watching a live television feed); Wendy
N. Davis, Hearsay, Gone Tomorrow?: Domestic Violence Cases at Issue as Judges Consider Which
Evidence to Allow, 90 A.B.A. J. 22, 24 (arguing that the trauma created in children by their abusers
may allow prosecutors to argue that the defendant waived their rights to confront the children in
court); but see United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280 (1st Cit. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
973 (1996).
[Tihat when a person who eventually emerges as a defendant (1) causes a potential wit-
ness's unavailability (2) by a wrongful act (3) undertaken with the intention of preventing
the potential witness from testifying at a future trial, then the defendant waives his right
to object on confrontation grounds to the admission of the unavailable declarant's out-of-
court statements at trial.
Id.
263. See generally People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118, 11124 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that Crawford "does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review where ... the defendant's
conviction became final before Crawford was announced."), cert. granted, No. 04SC565, 2004
Colo. LEXIS 1000 (Colo. Dec. 6, 2004); People v. Moore, No. 01CA1760, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS
1354, at *9-11 (Colo. Ct. App. July 29, 2004) (holding under the rule of forfeiture that defendant
cannot claim Confrontation Clause violation under Crawford after killing the declarant), cert. dis-
missed and remanded for cause, No. 04SC571, 2004 Colo. LEXIS 772 (Colo. Oct. 4, 2004); People
v. Candelaria, No. 01CA2467, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1021, at *13 (Colo. Ct. App. June 17, 2004)
(holding that there was no violation of confrontation rights under Crawford when witness with
cancer testified subject to cross-examination, but could not remember key facts); People v. Turley,
No. 03CA0845, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1895, at *3 (Colo. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2004) (holding that
Crawford does not change "the settled principles governing admission of hearsay in probation revo-
cation proceedings"); People v. Garrison, No. 01CA0527, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1819, at *3-4
(Colo. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2004) (holding that defendant's statements to a training manager were non-
testimonial because they did not fall into any of Crawford's three core classes of testimonial state-
ments); People v. Shreck, No. 02CA1413, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1712, at *34-36 (Colo. Ct. App.
Sept. 23, 2004) (holding that "admission of documentary evidence showing [defendant's] prior
convictions [did not] violate[] his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation ...."); People v. King,
No. 02CA0201, 2005 Colo. App. LEXIS 111, at *16 (Colo. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2004) (holding that
when "a victim makes an excited utterance to a police officer, in a noncustodial setting and without
indicia of formality, the statement is nontestimonial interrogation under Crawford.").
264. For an alternate discussion of the effect of Crawford in Colorado, see Will Hood InI &
Lucia Padilla, The Right to Confront Witnesses After Crawford v. Washington, COLO. LAW., Sept.
2004, at 83-90.
265. 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004).
266. Fry, 92 P.3d at 972.
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took the opportunity to reject the eight-factor reliability analysis con-
tained in Farrell.267 The Court stated, "[w]e therefore change our Con-
frontation Clause inquiry to whether a defendant had an adequate prior
opportunity to cross-examine, not whether the previous testimony is reli-
able."268 Although Fry clearly implicated the constitutional validity of
Colorado's child hearsay exception, the court never mentioned it in its
decision. To date, the Colorado Supreme Court has not addressed the
exception.
269
In People v. Compan,270 the Colorado Court of Appeals interpreted
Crawford and presented its own definition of "testimonial. 2 7 1 Although
this case predates Fry by one month, Fry did not cite to it. Under Craw-
ford, the Compan defendant sought to appeal a domestic violence con-
viction achieved partially through the admission of hearsay statements
under the excited utterances and medical diagnosis and treatment excep-
272tions. 2 Based on their reading of Crawford, the Court of Appeals for-mulated the following "testimonial statement" philosophy:
Thus, it appears that testimonial statements under Crawford will gen-
erally be (1) solemn or formal statements (not casual or off-hand re-
marks), (2) made for the purpose of proving or establishing facts in
judicial proceedings (not for business or personal purposes), (3) to a
government actor or agent (not to someone unassociated with gov-
ernment activity). 273
Since "[t]he victim's statements were not made for the purpose of
establishing facts in a subsequent proceeding", the statements were not274
testimonial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the defendant's convic-
275tion. For nontestimonial hearsay, Compan retained the Roberts reli-
ability approach previously adopted in Colorado.
276
Because Compan oversimplifies the meaning of the term "testimo-
nial," Compan might produce results inconsistent with Crawford. First,
Compan implies that testimonial statements "will generally ... be sol-
emni or formal statements (not casual or offhand remarks)."277 Crawford
did not present these two extremes as a choice between one or the other,
but instead, recognized that gray area may exist between them.278  A
267. Id. at 976.
268. Id.
269. See supra note 253.
270. 100 P.3d 533 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, No. 04SC422, 2004 Colo. LEXIS 849
(Colo. Oct. 25, 2004).
271. Compan, 100 P.3d at 536-37.
272. Id. at 535-36.
273. Id. at 537.
274. Id. at 538.
275. Id. at 535.
276. Id. at 538.
277. Id. at 537.
278. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51; See also supra text accompanying note 154.
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statement that is neither "solemn or formal" nor "casual or offhand" may
still be testimonial under Crawford.7 9 Jimmy's statements to his par-
ents, for example, fall into this category. Second, Compan oversimpli-
fies the "purpose" required for a statement to be testimonial by stating
that a testimonial statement "will generally be ... made for the purpose
of proving or establishing facts in judicial proceedings."280 Crawford
does not support this. On the declarant's side, Crawford says that a
statement is testimonial "under circumstances which would lead an ob-
jective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be avail-
able for use at a later trial.",28' By using the terms "made for the pur-
pose, 282 Compan has incorrectly replaced Crawford's objective test with
a subjective one. Compan ignores the listener's purpose in receiving the
statement, something to which Crawford devoted considerable atten-
283tion. Under Crawford, if the listener is a government agent and carry-
ing out an interrogation in the colloquial sense, the statement may be
testimonial regardless of the declarant's purpose.284 Third, Compan in-
correctly implies that a statement to a government actor or agent is de-
terminative in the testimonial analysis.285 Certainly, the involvement of
the government is a significant factor, but Crawford does not end the
testimonial analysis there.286 Crawford requires a deeper examination of
the circumstances. In a noble attempt to do what the United States Su-
preme Court refused to do-define "testimonial"-Compan tends to
gloss over the subtleties in Crawford itself.
Finally, two simultaneously issued Colorado Court of Appeals deci-
sions from the same three-judge panel involved the admissibility of
videotaped police interviews with sexually abused children. In People v.
Vigil,287 the court deemed the videotape of an interview with a seven-
year-old boy testimonial.288 The Court said that the police obtained the
child's statements under an interrogation, in the colloquial sense of the
word, because the interviewer had extensive training in interviewing
children, identified herself as a police officer, and ascertained that the
child understood what it meant to tell the truth.289 Furthermore, the court
believed that the child "reasonably expected his statements to be used
prosecutorially" because the child indicated "that [the] defendant should
279. Id.
280. Compan, 100 P.3d at 537.
281. Craviford, 541 U.S. at 51; see also supra text accompanying note 160.
282. Compan, 100 P.3d at 537.
283. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62; see also supra text accompanying note 168.
284, Crauford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
285. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
286. Id.
287. People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted in part and denied in
part, No. 04SC532, 2004 Colo. LEXIS 1030 (Colo. Dec. 20, 2004).
288. Vigil, 104 P.3d at 262.
289. Id. at 262.
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go to jail. 29° In addition, the police officer told the child he would need
to talk to her friend, the district attorney, who would "try to put [the]
defendant in jail for a long time."29' In the second case, People v. In re
R.A.S, 29 the court ruled on similar facts, citing Vigil to justify its deci-
sion.
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In addition to the Maryland Snowden case, other jurisdictions have
tackled Crawford in the context of sex crimes against children. So far,
appellate decisions in this area indicate that making a statement to a gov-
ernment official proves quite important in determining whether a state-
ment made by an unavailable out-of-court child declarant is "testimo-
nial. 294
The Crawford opinion did not contain any explicit language to jus-
tify a "testimonial" label for the four types of hearsay statements in the
hypothetical case against the man who allegedly molested Jimmy. To
determine whether the statements were testimonial required considera-
tion of Crawford's eighteen key phrases, the circumstances in which
Jimmy gave his statements, and the circumstances in which the different
listeners received them. Different circumstances will lead to different
results. Furthermore, as a result of Crawford, Colorado's child hearsay
exception, due to its Roberts foundation, probably will not survive con-
stitutional scrutiny as far as testimonial statements are concerned when
the defendant cannot cross-examine the child.295
CONCLUSION
While proponents of restoring the Confrontation Clause to a posi-
tion closer to its historical roots will no doubt delight in Crawford, the
opinion challenges those wishing to protect very young sexually and
physically abused children from the trauma of in-court testimony. Craw-
ford may result in the elimination of "tender age laws" previously formu-
lated with Roberts in mind. Less than one month after Crawford, the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals struck down Maryland's "tender age
290. Id.
291. Id. at 263.
292. No. 03CA1209, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1032, (Colo. Ct. App. June 17, 2004).
293. R.A.S., at *4-12.
294. See State v. Casatilla, 87 P.3d 1211, 1214 (Wash. App. 2004) (ruling that "[tihe state-
ments were extremely limited, and did not go to any disputed issue but merely asserted Nelson had
been touched sexually. Further, these statements were not testimonial in nature-they were not
elicited by a government official and were not given with an eye toward trial"), petition for review
deferred, 2005 Wash. LEXIS 46 (Wash. Jan. 4. 2005); People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2004) (ruling that "the child's statement was made to the executive director of the Chil-
dren's Assessment Center, not to a government employee, and the child's answer to the question of
whether she had an "owie" was not a statement in the nature of "'ex parte in-court testimony or its
functional equivalent."'), appeal denied, 688 N.W.2d 829 (Mich. 2004).
295. People v. Espinoza, No. H026266, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6573, at *18 (Cal. Ct.
App. July 13, 2004).
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law, 2 96 and the survivability of Colorado's child hearsay exception is
unlikely so far as testimonial statements go. Nevertheless, the proper
use of videotaped depositions and testimony via closed-circuit television
can mitigate the impact of Crawford on abused children.
Crawford will undoubtedly confound lawyers and judges for many
years to come, all trying to determine whether a particular statement
given by an unavailable declarant is "testimonial." The Court refrained
from providing a definition of testimonial, and it may never do so.
Crawford, like the Lilly decision that preceded it, is indicative of the
Court's one hundred year struggle to identify the proper exceptions to a
literal reading of the Confrontation Clause. Unlike the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which Crawford places beneath the Confrontation Clause, the
Crawford decision does not provide judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys with the clear and definite language that they might desire. If
Crawford provides one single lesson for lawyers and judges, it is that
whether a statement receives a testimonial label will depend almost en-
tirely on the circumstances in which the declarant gave it and the listener
received it.
Finally, the effect of Crawford on criminal prosecutions like that of
Jimmy's alleged sexual abuser cannot be understated. Given Jimmy's
unavailability, prior to Crawford a prosecutor could still take the case to
trial via Colorado's child hearsay exception. Post-Crawford, all testimo-
nial statements are inadmissible without cross-examination, and the
prosecutor may have to drop the charges as a result. While Crawford
strengthens the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation, in criminal
cases like that against three-year-old Jimmy's perpetrator, it weakens the
ability of prosecutors to press forward.
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